Seasons watched: 2015–16 to 2018–19 (Ages 18–21 seasons according to FBref)
Back in my early years of football writing, Ousmane Dembélé was someone I gushed over during his debut season for Stade Rennais. Even though some parts of the piece haven’t aged well, it’s still fair to defend the enthusiasm at the time. You don’t often see 18 year olds in a top 5 league generate shots for himself and others at the level he produced. He went from strength to strength in the Bundesliga, and by the summer of 2017, he ranked among the best young talents in football. While Barcelona spending over €100M on a 20 yr old in the wake of losing Neymar was an enormous gamble, he had the statistical profile and upside to where it wasn’t impossible to think the signing could’ve paid off in the long term.
In short, the move hasn’t worked out for either the player or the club to this point. A major reason why stems from Dembélé’s issues staying fit. From 2018–22, he played in only 35.8% of possible league minutes. A quick look at the documented lower-body injuries he’s endured makes for some somber reading. When healthy, he’s been good and even morphed into an elite floor-raiser last season as the club had to function in a world without having arguably the greater floor-raiser ever in 2018–21 Lionel Messi.
But there are other reasons besides injuries why things haven’t gone smoothly for Dembélé since moving to Spain. Going from the Bundesliga to La Liga meant less space was afforded to him, and he’d have to go against more set defenses. Perhaps the biggest reason was identifying the wrong kind of attacker who could work well alongside Messi at that stage of his career. Dembélé had the profile of a ball-dominant attacker who didn’t provide a ton without the ball, and that led to his talents not being fully maximized as it previously had been.
Scouting Report
Like it has been the case for several players in this series, Dembélé’s prowess as a dribbler is the thing that first comes to mind concerning his skillset. His use of feints and impressive explosion made him capable of receiving and carrying within the halfspaces, as well as cutting inside from wide against an unsettled defense. He had the reflexes and agility to evade multiple opponents in a single carry. When isolated in a 1v1 out wide, he had a left-right dribble that when it worked, it’d look like the defender was chasing their own tail (an example is shown around halfway through the compilation below). His most devastating move has been switching feet by faking a shot around the box. While he did this often throughout these four seasons, from the eye test it arguably peaked in his lone season at Dortmund. When one also factors in not being able to shade him in one direction because of being nearly ambipedal, you end up with one of the most electric dribblers in Europe.
The best way of describing Dembélé as a passer at this point was high-risk high-reward. If there was any opening to thread the needle with a pass into a dangerous area, he often recognized it and looked to make a play. It’d work out more times than not. He particularly loved freezing the defense before attempting reverse passes into the box. In transition was when his passing arguably came to life the most. The dribbling prowess allowed him to be a strong creator off the dribble. He had solid touch on short range crosses with either foot, and he can blend his fake shot spamming into making valuable passes on the move. Having less transition opportunities in La Liga put a notable dent on his playmaking with a drop in chance creation. The mindset of trying to make home run passes didn’t mesh as well with probing and having to be patient during slower sequences of possession. He also provided extra value from set pieces, and that maintained throughout this period.
Dembélé’s off-ball activity during this period shifted quite a bit. With Rennes, he floated across the final third and showed a greater willingness to run into space in behind. It wasn’t perfect but his speed afforded him a greater margin of error in these instances. At Dortmund, he floated between being a right #10 and more of a wide player. Even when deployed on the right flank, he wasn’t the type to constantly keep the opposition stretched. The off-ball motor was similar to what he showed in France. His stint with Barcelona had him be very idle at times, and while staying stationary isn’t in isolation a bad thing, that wasn’t the case here. His best forward runs with Barcelona tended to be going from the channel to the flank to set up 1v1s or crosses into the box. For lack of a better description, it just seemed like Dembélé didn’t know how to maneuver without the ball around a heliocentric star like Messi.
Despite the decent shot rates and goal scoring return for a winger, Dembélé’s lack of movement into the box denied him access to ample quality opportunities. He was another case of an attacker who relied on strong finishing to prop up his non-penalty goals per 90 mins rate, averaging 0.38 from 2016–19. Being genuinely two-footed did help in bumping up his xG on certain shots by a few percentage points, as defenders would sell out on him faking a shot which allowed him more breathing room from a slightly closer location.
Analysis
It’s easy to see why Dembélé was held in such high regard at different parts during this period. He was a dynamic on-ball mover, able to constantly wreak havoc off the dribble from multiple areas with impressive agility and acceleration. The good outweighed the bad when it came to the high-risk passing in open play. Transition opportunities were when the ball carrying and passing truly came to life largely due to the unpredictability factor, particularly in 2017. He never provided strong value without the ball, but he increasingly became more static at Barcelona. Being a good finisher who can manufacture slightly better opportunities off the dribble was what got him respectable goal rates, rather than being on the end of numerous high quality chances.
Dembélé’s statistical resume is quite good, but whether it’s great is up for some debate. The individual production was great when healthy, ranking 27th, 47th, and 47th in non-penalty goals and assists per 90 mins among qualified players within the big five leagues in three of the four seasons (2016, 2017, 2019). That outpaced his expected numbers to a decent degree, which were still clearly good but look less impressive. He’s always been an prolific ball carrier but he evolved into being an elite overall play driver in 2017 when also accounting for his passing. It’s perhaps not a coincidence that he registered his highest usage rate in 2017 as well.
The public models paint a similar picture. DAVIES only dates back to the 2017–18 season, so we’re not entirely sure how it would’ve evaluated Dembélé’s 2016 and 2017 seasons (my guess is good in 2016 and nearly great in 2017). It had him at 0.11 per 90 in 2019, comparable among 21 or under players not named Kylian Mbappe and in the top 75 among all players with at least 800 league minutes. Hugh Klein’s adjusted plus-minus model thinks 2017 was when he contributed the most in attack, ranking in the top 100 for offensive impact per 90 among outfield players with the same minutes threshold. That falls in line with rough With or Without You data I looked at from that season, as Dortmund’s attack functioned considerably better in the matches where he played at least 45 mins (table is below). The +/- xG numbers in attack FBref has from 2018–19 show less of the drop off as Barcelona produced 1.99 xG for per 90 in the minutes he played, vs 1.88 xG per 90 with him off.
+/- or WOWY data in football can be subject to a good amount of noise, and should be used with caution in player analysis. While I do think this is potentially one of those instances where they might be hinting at something real, it’s tough to have a strong confidence level. Part of the reason for the lack of confidence stems from also having to account for the possible league effects. With that in mind, I asked everyone’s favorite performance analyst Carlon Carpenter for his thoughts on 2016–17 Borussia Dortmund and the Bundesliga:
16/17 was Thomas Tuchel’s second season in charge, and by this time the team had become the perfect image of the coach’s style of play he looked to implement: Still maintaining the pressing (with some caveats) and ability to create transitions as Klopp’s teams did, but with a more defined focus on keeping possession wherever possible. The focus on transitions was a major point of emphasis in the Bundesliga at this point in time, but in the short time that Guardiola had been at close rivals Bayern Munich, the need and desire for clubs to monopolize the ball in the final third, and create counter attacks (as well as prevent them through good on-ball rest defence) was at it’s zenith.
What did this mean for Dembele? In Tuchel’s Dortmund, the possession oriented focus focused much of its output in the wider areas of the pitch — Looking to create 2v1s with the full back and winger, or overload one side of the pitch to create 1v1s. Both areas which Ousmane Dembele thrived. As well, a healthy dose of opportunities to run on the ball against stretched lines during transitions led to the staggering attacking output he was able to put together in that season. For context, he completed 6.14 dribbles per 90 — Quite insane numbers.
I also wanted to get the Spanish football point of view on the matter, so I spoke to Sam Gustafson. He had similar thoughts on the nature of the Bundesliga, and also touched on the personnel issues which impacted Dembélé’s performance during his first two seasons at Barcelona:
On the personnel level, of course Dortmund had nobody who was eating up touches like [Lionel] Messi. You join a side with a player like that and all of a sudden you’re forced to operate off the ball way more (floor raiser, ceiling raiser stuff), which is an area of Dembélé’s game I feel like you could say *still* hasn’t developed to a high level. Also, you watch Dortmund Dembélé highlights of him picking the ball up at like midfield and then knocking it long and running around multiple defenders. Not only is it harder to do that against La Liga defenses, but if he does do that, he’s probably just leaving old man Messi and [Luis] Suarez 30 yards behind him.
All of this makes sense, from the benefits that Dortmund side afforded for an attacker to the contrasting tactical environments in the Bundesliga and La Liga. In hindsight, placing more emphasis on these factors at the time of the transfer would’ve led to a little more skepticism on splashing the cash for Dembélé as a Neymar replacement. The latter could play off of Messi in a way the former never came close to accomplishing himself. It’s possible that the different league and team dynamics meant he couldn’t quite replicate his 2017 season even if a similar role had been available in Barcelona, but without substantial improvements being made off-ball (which was likely part of the hope when signing him), being a high usage attacker was the best route to do so. With Messi still near the peak of his powers at that point, that opportunity couldn’t have happened.
At the end of the day, I found it hard to ballpark Dembélé’s offensive value during these seasons. There is at least some evidence to suggest a larger on-ball role was the best way to get the most out of him, and in that sense, 2017 Dortmund might be a compelling point in his favor. While there were other offensive contributors, he shouldered a large burden and the end results were a very strong attack on at worst a top 15 club in Europe. The decline in individual production in 2019 further points in the direction of him needing a higher usage to succeed, although he was still a positive contributor for a solid Barcelona side that nearly won both La Liga and the Champions League.
A sticking point is we never saw him have his own team in a league less suited to his gifts so we’d have greater confidence on his floor raising capacity. For example, how good of a play driver would he have been if he had stayed in Ligue 1 longer and Rennes built around him? Between a bit of reservations on his floor-raising at this point, his questionable portability, and not trusting that he could be fit for at least 65–70% of the season, it leaves us with my assessment of 2016–19 Ousmane Dembélé as a very good attacking prospect.
A big thank you once again to Yash Thakur for his contributions to the piece, please go support his work. I’d also like to thank Carlon and Sam for their help in making this profile possible. If you want to support my series, that would be greatly appreciated but it is understandable if this isn’t an option given the unprecedented times we’re still living in.
Previous Profiles
#1: Patrick Kluivert #2: Thierry Henry #3: Michael Owen #4: Javier Saviola #5: Fernando Torres #6: Wayne Rooney #7: Lionel Messi #8: Sergio Agüero #9: Karim Benzema #10: Alexandre Pato #11: Raheem Sterling #12:Anthony Martial #13: Dele Alli
