Seasons watched: 2015–16 to 2017–18 (Ages 19–21 according to FBref)
For Tottenham fans and avid watchers of the Premier League, Dele Alli’s goal vs Crystal Palace from the 2015–16 season felt like one of those early “OMG” moments in the career arc of a burgeoning talent who’d later on became a star. We’ve seen it before from young English players, including Wayne Rooney’s strike vs Arsenal in 2002 and Michael Owen’s solo effort vs Argentina in the 1998 World Cup. It was an instance of ingenuity in a season where both him and Tottenham overdelivered compared to preseason expectations (albeit with the caveat of their campaign ending in less than stellar fashion).
Not having any silverware does put a ceiling on how much one can romanticize this period in Spurs’ history. That said, it’s the best multiyear stretch they’ve had since the advent of color television and Dele’s emergence was a major reason for their ascension. The early 2010s under Harry Redknapp were fun and they did go further in the Champions League under his stewardship than the 2016–18 iteration, but they never came close to hitting the high points domestically that Mauricio Pochettino’s Spurs did. If anything, the biggest issue they had in 2017 and 2018 was having to deal with a much improved Premier League environment, including an all-time great English side in 2017–18 Manchester City.
While he should theoretically be in the heart of his prime at age 26, one can’t help but feel that the window for a career resurgence is starting to close for Dele. He’s one of the great examples of how much context can both enhance and diminish a player’s ability to impact winning. The constant change in team environment over the past few seasons has made it hard for him to play in an optimal role. When Spurs were at full bloom under Pochettino, his combination of dynamic off-ball movement and tertiary playmaking made him a perfect fit.
Scouting Report
When you think of Dele at his peak, what immediately comes to mind was his eagerness to hunt for space. It could be him trying to stretch the defense by looking for runs in behind, or constantly shuffling to make himself available between the lines. From slightly withdrawn positions to get on the blindside of opposing centerbacks, he’d often look to sprint into the box which made him a good target for different types of aerial passes from the halfspaces. Dele had very good instincts to keep himself onside in a variety of situations. In addition, he had great synergy with Kane in terms of moving into vacated space that the latter created, making sure the opponent’s backline was constantly pinned. A common occurrence would be Dele sprinting forward to get onto a potential first time pass from Kane.
I found Dele to be a largely willing passer at an early age, especially from more of a standstill position vs trying to create from a carry. He would often try to squeeze passes into tight windows in dangerous areas. This isn’t to say that he was necessarily a good passer seeing as he did have issues with how much weight he’d put on his deliveries, but rather he at least recognized more high value opportunities than not and would attempt a pass. Disorganized high lines were something he could take advantage of to varying degrees. 2018 likely saw a jump in his passing abilities, with greater consistency in weighting of the passes alongside better understanding in knowing when to release after attracting 2–3 opponents on the ball.
Solo ball progression wasn’t an especially strong area for Dele, particularly from the flanks. He didn’t have the consistent explosiveness and trickery needed to beat guys off the dribble in isolated 1v1s. That was less of an issue in the interior. He was quite good at drawing fouls in part due to effective shielding and baiting opponents to draw a whistle. His ability to receive in tight spaces was pretty good but perhaps not prolific. He had enough strength and balance to absorb some challenges when driving play. The carries which led to shots were shorter in length within the final third and much more likely to end up in him shooting, which makes sense given his player archetype as someone who looked to finish sequences off himself.
Dele’s prolific off-ball movement allowed him to access high quality shots in a way that you don’t often see from non-strikers. While he wasn’t afraid of letting it fly from range, those moments were more than made up for with how frequently he got himself around the 6 yard area for a variety of finishes (including the occasional chip over goalkeepers). The strong finishing is similar to others we’ve seen in the event data era (Pato, Martial), although Dele’s ability without the ball was better by some distance, relative to their respective archetype.
Analysis
As mentioned throughout, what made Dele a fascinating prospect was his ability to destabilize the opposition without the ball. He constantly kept teams honest by surveying for space in behind, whether it be through the middle or towards the back post. You’d watch Spurs circulate possession within the final third, and a few seconds later he’d end up wide open around the 6 yard box for an excellent scoring chance. Very good spatial awareness, quality footwork, and a high revving motor made him a handful to deal with. The on-ball results were not as robust, but still fine enough. He could contribute some ball carrying when positioned in deeper areas. The playmaking saw a positive jump in 2018, likely due to having greater familiarity with a largely untouched core of players. Dele’s shot profile and above average finishing made him a great foil alongside Kane. We haven’t even touched on how good of a pressing forward he was, constantly helping out to create opportunities going the other way.
Dele’s individual production was quite good during this period, generating at least 19 non-penalty goals and assists in each of the three seasons. He ranked 4th, 7th, and 17th in NPGA per 90 among qualified under-21 players in the big five leagues. The goal and assist numbers in 2016 were impressive given he initially spent some time playing as part of a pivot in Spurs’ midfield. There was a little overperformance between expected and actual goal/assist numbers in 2016 and 2017, although one could’ve argued that some of it was the result of being one of multiple above average finishers at Spurs.
The more granular on-ball metrics aren’t quite as favorable. Expected threat doesn’t think too highly of Dele as either a passer or ball carrier, having him more in the middle of the pack in these seasons. It does to some extent confirms what was seen on film. He was ranked as a good U21 prospect by the DAVIES model in 2018. This paints the picture of someone who’d likely be best not having a large creation usage. Fortunately for Spurs, they had the primary playmaker in Christian Eriksen to help Dele focus on what he did best, receiving the ball in threatening areas and turning those moments into shots.
It bears repeating how good Tottenham were from 2016–18. Their 86 point tally in 2017 would’ve been enough to finish first or tied for first in 11 seasons since the PL went to a 38 game schedule in 1995–96. Only 2009 Liverpool, 2012 Manchester United, and 2022 Liverpool had 86 or more points and finished 2nd since 1996. Comparing teams from different eras is always a tricky endeavor, but at least in a macro sense, one can see the bad timing Spurs had. The underlying numbers were very good but not necessarily great, averaging 0.81 non-penalty expected goal difference in 2017 and 0.87 in 2018. That’s the kind of profile more likely to produce a point tally in the high 70s, but they benefitted from the variance upshot in attack in 2017 to propel themselves into pseudo title contention. Accomplishing this is even more impressive when factoring in having a wage bill way below the rest of the big-6 PL clubs.
In this series, we’ve seen young players who were primarily off-ball threats experience different fortunes when their environment changed. Patrick Kluivert produced elite numbers on those legendary Ajax sides of the mid 1990s, but that dropped considerably by 1997 because of a drainage in surrounding talent and having to shoulder more usage in a different role with AC Milan in 1998. Fernando Torres had the oppositive occur. His U21 yrs were spent having to floor raise limited Atletico Madrid sides to respectability. The move to Liverpool saw him finally have a capable dance partner in Steven Gerrard, which led to a spike in individual numbers during his age 23–25 seasons and propelling the club to title contention in 2009. It’s through this lens that one could begin to understand why Dele’s career has taken a bad turn from 2019-Present.
Dele is among the most context-dependent players I’ve come across. I do wonder how good he would’ve been if those Spurs sides weren’t constructed as they were. Having an elite movement striker (Kane), a high-end playmaker (Eriksen), and the prototypical inverted winger (Son Heung-min) in the squad made Dele’s life easier. It’s hard to say that he had more on-ball capacity to be explored to compensate for not being able to fully leverage his off-ball gifts, if the situation was less favorable. The counterpoint, which is where I lean more towards, is that the results were borderline great when the team environment suited his gifts. The individual numbers were very good, and Spurs overperformed relative to their financial capabilities at the time. Balancing those two views, I land on 2016–18 Dele Alli as a very good attacking prospect.
A big thank you once again to Yash Thakur for his contributions to the piece, please go support his work. I’d also like to thank Nathan A Clark for his help in making this profile possible. If you want to support my series, that would be greatly appreciated but it is understandable if this isn’t an option given the unprecedented times we’re still living in.
Previous Profiles
#1: Patrick Kluivert #2: Thierry Henry #3: Michael Owen #4: Javier Saviola #5: Fernando Torres #6: Wayne Rooney #7: Lionel Messi #8: Sergio Agüero #9: Karim Benzema #10: Alexandre Pato #11: Raheem Sterling #12:Anthony Martial
